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BREAKING UP THE FOCUS ON RELATIONSHIPS 




In 1983, the U.S. Supreme Court adopted the “personal benefit” 
requirement as an objective test for insider trading to help determine when 
confidential information is tipped for an improper purpose.  Under this test, 
a tipper acts improperly by receiving a personal benefit for sharing 
confidential, nonpublic information, even if the tipper does not trade using 
the information.  For instance, when a tipper leaks confidential information 
to a trading friend or relative, the tipper benefits personally because this 
amounts to trading on the confidential information and then gifting the 
profits.  The personal benefit requirement is applied differently among the 
circuits, however, and the Second Circuit has changed its interpretation of 
the personal benefit test three times since 2014.  Currently, it requires 
prosecutors to show a meaningfully close personal relationship between 
tipper and tippee using evidence suggesting either a quid pro quo 
relationship or the tipper’s intention to benefit the tippee.  This Note argues 
that personal benefit tests that evaluate the closeness of a tipper-tippee 
relationship detracts from the Supreme Court’s goal of separating tips leaked 
for proper and improper purposes.  Instead, this Note proposes two distinct 
tests for nonpecuniary personal benefits: one test for gifts of confidential 
information and another test for a tipper’s intention to benefit a particular 
recipient.  The new test for gifts would apply to anyone, not just close friends 
or family members, but would require prosecutors to prove the tipper’s intent 
to gift the information.  The new test for determining whether a tipper 
intended to benefit a particular recipient would establish a rebuttable 
presumption that the tipper disclosed information for a proper purpose.  The 
prosecution could overcome this presumption with evidence of an improper 
purpose for the disclosure.  These two tests would help to implement the goals 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2020, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2013, University of 
Virginia.  I would like to thank Kelly Larkin and my colleagues on the Fordham Law Review 
for helping me discover the legal controversy for the basis of this Note.  I would also like to 
thank my faculty advisor, Caroline Gentile, for guiding my research and helping me learn 
about the current insider trading regulations and congressional intent behind federal securities 
laws.  I would also like to thank my family for helping me talk through the issues discussed in 
this Note and for supporting me throughout the process. 
 
268 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
of securities regulation to increase the accuracy of prices, protect investors 
from harm, and maintain fairness and confidence in securities markets. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In current jurisprudence, criminal violations for insider trading fall under 
the umbrella of securities fraud and do not constitute distinct crimes.  The 
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Securities Exchange Act of 19341 (the “Exchange Act”) does not explicitly 
prohibit insider trading.2  Since the passage of the Exchange Act, neither 
Congress nor the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have defined 
insider trading because both worried that a specific definition would limit the 
broad and flexible language in section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, which was 
designed to react to developments in the securities industry.3  Recognizing 
this ambiguity, the current SEC Commissioner Robert J. Jackson, Jr. and 
former United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York Preet 
Bharara recently formed the Bharara Task Force on Insider Trading 
(“Bharara Task Force”) to consider insider trading reforms.4  Tipper-tippee 
liability is one subset of insider trading liability that the Bharara Task Force 
may seek to reform. 
To better discuss the elements of tipper-tippee insider trading liability, this 
Note will first define certain key terms.  A “tipper” is someone who discloses 
material nonpublic information (MNPI) to another person.5  A “tippee” is the 
person who receives the MNPI and trades on that information.6  “Material” 
describes any information that a reasonable person would consider important 
before deciding to trade securities.7  “Nonpublic” means any information 
“not widely disseminated or . . . received with the expectation it will remain 
confidential.”8  For a tippee to be criminally liable for insider trading, a tipper 
must receive a “personal benefit” from tipping the MNPI.9 
Part of the ambiguity the Bharara Task Force must resolve stems from the 
Second Circuit’s affirmation of Mathew Martoma’s conviction for securities 
fraud in United States v. Martoma10 (Martoma I) and United States v. 
 
 1. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2012). 
 2. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, An Overview of Insider Trading Law and Policy:  An 
Introduction to the Research Handbook on Insider Trading, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
INSIDER TRADING 1, 1–2 (Stephen M. Bainbridge ed., 2013); Jon Eisenberg, Insider Trading 
Law After Salman, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 18, 2017), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/01/18/insider-trading-law-after-salman/ 
[https://perma.cc/6D8D-UZGJ]. 
 3. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-355, at 13 (1983), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 
2286; H.R. REP. NO. 94-229, at 92 (1975) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
321, 323–24; Corporate Take-Overs and Insider Trading Scandals in the 1980s, SEC. & 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION HIST. SOC’Y, http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/it/ 
raisingStakes_a.php [https://perma.cc/GR8P-9KN6] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019) [hereinafter 
SEC Historical Society 1980s Scandals]. 
 4. Preet Bharara & Robert J. Jackson Jr., Opinion, Insider Trading Laws Haven’t Kept 
Up with the Crooks, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/09/ 
opinion/sec-insider trading-united-states.html [https://perma.cc/235X-4T8B]. 
 5. See Sara Almousa, Note, Friends with Benefits?:  Clarifying the Role Relationships 
Play in Satisfying the Personal Benefit Requirement Under Tipper-Tippee Liability, 23 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 1251, 1251 (2016). 
 6. See id. 
 7. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988). 
 8. SHEELAH KOLHATKAR, BLACK EDGE 119 (2017) (quoting a slide presentation of 
former SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt at SAC Capital). 
 9. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663–64 (1983) (noting that examples of personal benefits 
include pecuniary gain, reputational benefit, quid pro quo, an intention to benefit a particular 
recipient, and a gift to a close friend or family member who trades). 
 10. 869 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2017), amended by 894 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2018). 
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Martoma11 (Martoma II).  Dr. Sidney Gilman tipped confidential drug trial 
information to Martoma, who traded using the information.12  Martoma’s 
appeal raised the issue of whether Dr. Gilman personally benefited from 
tipping the information, which was a necessary element for Martoma’s 
liability.13  Martoma paid Dr. Gilman $1000 per hour for consulting sessions 
but did not pay for the sessions in which Dr. Gilman leaked the confidential 
information.14 
Initially, a three-judge panel found that the jury instructions regarding the 
closeness of Dr. Gilman and Martoma’s relationship were not erroneous and 
the evidence sufficiently established that Dr. Gilman personally benefited 
because sharing the confidential information with Martoma helped develop 
their friendship.15  The same three-judge panel later issued an amended 
opinion and clarified that while the jury instructions were erroneous 
regarding the necessary closeness of Martoma and Dr. Gilman’s relationship, 
this error did not prejudice Martoma because the evidence implied a quid pro 
quo between Martoma and Dr. Gilman.16  In effect, the panel switched 
theories to understand Dr. Gilman’s personal benefit:  the first opinion found 
that developing the friendship provided the benefit and the second opinion 
found that the benefit arose from the quid pro quo relationship.  Congress 
and the SEC must reform tipper-tippee liability to prevent prosecutors from 
substituting theories to more easily establish a tipper’s personal benefit and 
to encourage more consistent applications of personal benefit tests. 
Officials and scholars still debate how to define the relevant standards and 
goals for insider trading liability.  The debates and uncertainties regarding 
the purposes of insider trading regulations complicate consistent enforcement 
attempts.  The Exchange Act’s goals include ensuring fair and honest pricing 
mechanisms for securities, fair dealing in securities without advantages for 
certain investors, economically efficient costs for securities transactions, and 
open and orderly markets to the extent practical.17  Some scholars argue that 
limiting liability for insider trading decreases investor protection and reduces 
fairness in securities markets.18  Others argue that permitting more insider 
trading helps promote efficient capital markets and improves the accuracy of 
securities prices.19 
Judges also disagree about how to interpret and apply insider trading 
regulations and legislative intent.  In the 1977 case Santa Fe Industries, Inc. 
v. Green,20 the U.S Supreme Court stated that the fundamental purpose of 
 
 11. 894 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2018). 
 12. Id. at 69. 
 13. Id. at 67; see Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663. 
 14. Martoma II, 894 F.3d at 69. 
 15. Martoma I, 869 F.3d at 73. 
 16. Martoma II, 894 F.3d at 68. 
 17. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-229, at 91–92 (1975) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1975 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 321, 322–23. 
 18. See infra Part II.B. 
 19. See infra Part II.A. 
 20. 430 U.S. 462 (1977). 
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the Exchange Act was to promote full disclosure.21  Three years later, in 
Chiarella v. United States,22 the Court backtracked and stated that “neither 
the Congress nor the [SEC] ever has adopted a parity-of-information rule.”23  
The Chiarella majority held that section 10(b) of the Exchange Act does not 
require disclosure for mere possession of MNPI.24 
The Supreme Court in the 1980s established the foundation for much of 
the current jurisprudence regarding insider trading.25  In the 1983 case Dirks 
v. SEC,26 the Court identified when tippees must abstain from trading after 
receiving MNPI.27  The Court found that a tippee only assumes a fiduciary 
duty to abstain from trading if:  (1) the tipper breached a fiduciary duty; (2) 
the tippee knew or should have known that the tipper breached that duty; and 
(3) the tipper personally benefitted from disclosing the tip (the “personal 
benefit” requirement).28  Because courts often cannot definitively determine 
the intent of a tipper who shares MNPI, the Supreme Court used the personal 
benefit requirement to help identify when tippers disclose information for 
improper purposes.29 
Courts struggle to consistently apply tests involving nonpecuniary benefits 
to tippers, such as when the tipper gifts the information to a friend or relative 
or intends to benefit a particular recipient.30  Gifting confidential information 
to a trading friend or relative qualifies as a personal benefit; the Supreme 
Court analogized this to tippers trading on the information themselves and 
then gifting the proceeds to the tippee.31  “Tipping chains” best illustrate the 
issues for nonpecuniary personal benefits, and chains occur when the tippee 
who trades on the MNPI is several people removed from the insider who 
originally disclosed the information. 
A hypothetical shows the dilemma juries face when attempting to infer the 
personal benefit received by a tipper.  A hedge fund trader attempts to gather 
information to make beneficial trades for her hedge fund.  The trader makes 
financial models and interviews professionals but also discovers information 
about two companies’ earnings statements that have not yet been released.  
The trader uses this information to make profitable trades for her hedge fund.  
Insiders at each company previously released this earnings information to 
investor-relations teams, but it is unclear how the information leaked from 
the investor-relations teams to the trader.  The information passed through 
several people before coming to the trader.  The trader previously gave career 
advice to one of the insiders and went to church with another.  Based on these 
 
 21. Id. at 477–78. 
 22. 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
 23. Id. at 233. 
 24. Id. at 235. 
 25. See infra Parts I.A.3–4.  See generally Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Chiarella, 
445 U.S. 222. 
 26. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
 27. Id. at 654, 659–60. 
 28. Id. at 660–62. 
 29. Id. at 662–63. 
 30. See infra Part I.C. 
 31. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664. 
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facts, should the trader face insider trading liability because the insiders 
gifted the information or intended to benefit the trader? 
The above hypothetical represents a similar fact pattern to that found in 
United States v. Newman.32  In Newman, the Second Circuit established a 
heightened standard to reduce convictions in cases with more remote and 
tenuous tipper-tippee relationships.33  Prior to Newman, prosecutors won 
eighty-five consecutive insider trading cases in the Second Circuit between 
2009 and 2014 due to less stringent requirements necessary to infer a 
personal benefit from a gift.34  The Newman standard used a two-element test 
to determine whether the prosecution successfully proved the personal 
benefit requirement for a gift.  The first element required that the tipper and 
tippee develop or maintain a “meaningfully close personal relationship.”35  
The second element required that the relationship cause an exchange 
involving a potential pecuniary gain or something similarly valuable in 
nature.36 
After Newman, scholars began using the term “gift theory” to describe the 
relevant tipper personal benefit.37  Gift theory usually describes the personal 
benefit received when a tipper gifts confidential information to friends or 
family.38  Vague language from Dirks also allows courts to interpret an 
intention to benefit a particular recipient as a tipper personal benefit under 
gift theory.39  This makes sense because when giving a gift, the giver intends 
to benefit the recipient, and thus any intentional benefit should also qualify 
as a gift.  However, the distinction becomes murkier when applied.  For 
instance, imagine that a tenant shares MNPI with a doorman.  A facial review 
of the facts may suggest that the tenant gifted the MNPI to the doorman to 
help the doorman make a profitable trade.  But, the tenant may have 
inadvertently leaked the tip. 
Under Newman, to determine if a personal benefit exists due to a gift of 
MNPI, the court must first look at the relationship between the tenant and the 
doorman.  Although the tenant and doorman maintain a relationship, the issue 
remains whether the relationship is meaningfully close and personal.  
Additional tests to determine an appropriate closeness of the relationship may 
draw the court’s focus away from the original question of insider trading to 
whether the tipper shared the MNPI for an improper purpose. 
 
 32. 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014) (overturning the convictions of Todd Newman and 
Anthony Chiasson for securities fraud in the Southern District of New York). 
 33. Id. at 448; see infra Part I.C.1. 
 34. Katherine Drummonds, Note, Resuscitating Dirks:  How the Salman “Gift Theory” 
of Tipper-Tippee Personal Benefit Would Improve Insider Trading Law, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
833, 841–42 (2016). 
 35. Newman, 773 F.3d at 452. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Gift theory is also sometimes called tipper-tippee liability or tipper liability. See 
generally Drummonds, supra note 34. 
 38. Abigail Bush, Note, A Friend in Need May Get You in Trouble for Insider Trading 
Indeed:  An Argument for the Meaningfully Close Personal Relationship Definition of 
Friendship Under the Gift Theory, 107 GEO. L.J. 1, 2 (2018). 
 39. See infra Part I.C.4. 
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The Supreme Court, the Second Circuit, and the Ninth Circuit have all 
heard appeals regarding the application of personal benefit tests since 2014.  
In United States v. Salman,40 the Ninth Circuit declined to follow Newman’s 
two-element test and instead followed the Dirks precedent for personal 
benefits from gifts of MNPI.41  The Supreme Court granted certiorari for 
Salman and agreed that Dirks resolved the issue easily.42  The Court also 
abrogated the second element of Newman because its requirement of a 
pecuniary gain or something similarly valuable lacked consistency with 
Dirks.43 
After Salman, the Second Circuit reexamined the remaining 
“meaningfully close personal relationship”44 element of the Newman test in 
Martoma I.45  Initially, a majority of a three-judge panel relied on the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Salman to abrogate this element of the 
Newman test.46  Ten months later, the same panel and two-judge majority 
issued an amended opinion that no longer completely rejected the Newman 
test.47  The majority found that a jury cannot declare that a trading relative or 
friend received a personal benefit through a gift without finding “either that 
tipper and tippee shared a relationship suggesting a quid pro quo or that the 
tipper gifted confidential information with the intention to benefit the 
tippee.”48 
Insider trading jurisprudence and scholarship show that courts need 
reforms to more consistently apply personal benefit tests for nonpecuniary 
benefits.  Prosecutors argue for a broad standard for gifts that applies to 
everyone, not just to friends or family.49  The Supreme Court has rejected 
such a broad standard multiple times50 and acted only to revert case law back 
to the Dirks precedent.51  The Second Circuit has changed its gift theory 
personal benefit test three times since 2014.52  Investors and securities 
professionals want a standard that more clearly defines insider trading 
violations and reduces reliance on circumstantial or subjective evidence 
showing the closeness of a relationship between tippers and tippees.53 
The confusion over gift theory has created two questions.  First, how 
should insider trading law define the relationship standards for gifts of 
MNPI?  Second, how should the law distinguish between gifted tips and tips 
 
 40. 792 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2015), aff’d, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016). 
 41. Id. at 1092. 
 42. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 427 (2016). 
 43. Id. at 428. 
 44. United States v. Newman 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 45. Martoma I, 869 F.3d 58, 67 (2d Cir. 2017), amended by 894 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2018). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Martoma II, 894 F.3d 64, 71 (2d Cir. 2018). 
 48. Id. at 68. 
 49. See Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 426 (2016). 
 50. See id. at 426–27; Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 656 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 
445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980). 
 51. See Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 427. 
 52. See infra Part I.C. 
 53. See infra Part I.C.1. 
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intended to benefit a particular recipient?  These questions also include 
corollary questions of how to draw boundaries for the requisite closeness of 
relationships for gifts to friends and how to apply liability standards in cases 
involving remote tippees in tipping chains. 
This Note resolves the tension regarding gift theory personal benefit tests.  
Part I explains the development of insider trading jurisprudence from the 
1960s to the Martoma II decision in 2018.  Part II contrasts theories that argue 
that insider trading promotes efficient capital markets and more accurately 
prices securities against theories that argue that regulations promote fairness 
and protect investors from harm.  Part III argues that courts should 
distinguish personal benefits as gifts from those intended to benefit a 
particular recipient and suggests the creation of new and distinct personal 
benefit tests for each of the above categories.  The new test for finding a 
personal benefit to be a gift would require prosecutors to prove the scienter 
element rather than the close relationship element.  The new test for intention 
to benefit a particular recipient would establish a rebuttable presumption of 
legitimacy for disclosures. 
I.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF INSIDER TRADING LAWS 
Enforcement and promulgation of federal securities regulations has 
changed significantly since the passage of the Exchange Act.  Part I traces 
the development of insider trading jurisprudence from the passage of the 
Exchange Act through the Martoma II decision.  Part I.A explains how the 
Supreme Court rejected an equal-access-to-information standard and instead 
required a breach of fiduciary duty to find nondisclosure fraudulent.  The 
Court also added the personal benefit requirement for cases involving tippers.  
Part I.B describes how the SEC expanded insider trading liability by 
promulgating Regulation Fair Disclosure (“Reg FD”) and Rule 10b-5-2 and 
by persuading the Supreme Court to adopt the “misappropriation theory.”  
Part I.C shows how standards for finding that a gift conferred the personal 
benefit changed after the Newman, Salman, Martoma I, and Martoma II 
decisions.  Part I.D discusses two theories about the appropriateness of a 
closeness requirement for friendships and how to apply tests that accurately 
determine a relationship’s closeness. 
A.  Competing Theories of Equal Access and Fiduciary Duty 
Part I.A details the development of insider trading jurisprudence from the 
Exchange Act to the Dirks decision.  Part I.A.1 explains how the Exchange 
Act and Rule 10b-5 apply to insider trading.  Part I.A.2 describes how the 
Second Circuit sided with the SEC’s view that investors should have equal 
access to MNPI by adopting a broad rule requiring anyone to disclose or 
abstain from trading when they possess MNPI.  Part I.A.3 then explains how 
the Supreme Court rejected the “equal access” rule and implemented the 
“fiduciary duty” rule for securities fraud.  Finally, Part I.A.4 describes the 
Supreme Court’s addition of the personal benefit requirement as an objective 
test for determining improper purposes for tips of MNPI. 
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1.  Early Regulations:  The Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 
Following the stock market crash in 1929, Congress established federal 
regulation of securities markets by passing the Securities Act of 193354 (the 
“Securities Act”) and the Exchange Act in 1934.55  The Exchange Act created 
the SEC and gave it broad power to prevent unscrupulous traders from 
manipulating the sale of securities on a national security exchange.56  Section 
10(b) of the Exchange Act bans anyone from directly or indirectly using any 
manipulative or deceptive device to contravene any rules the SEC prescribes 
to protect investors or the public interest.57  Nothing in the original text of 
the Exchange Act specifically mentioned insider trading.58  Despite this 
omission, legislative history supported the SEC’s decision to use the broad 
language and delegation of authority in section 10(b) to develop a flexible 
standard for securities fraud that applies to any developments in the securities 
industry and to new forms of manipulation or deceit.59  Using this flexible 
standard, the SEC originally interpreted section 10(b) to require traders to 
fully disclose any MNPI in an effort to promote fairness in the securities 
industry.60 
The SEC first exercised its rulemaking authority under section 10(b) in 
1942 by promulgating Rule 10b-5.61  Similar to the language in section 10(b), 
the SEC enacted Rule 10b-5 as a broad rule to protect investors and combat 
securities fraud.62  Rule 10b-5 specifically prohibits anyone from using any 
device or scheme to defraud, make untrue statements or omit statements of 
material fact, or engage in acts of fraud or deceit regarding the purchase or 
sale of securities.63  Despite the general provisions of Rule 10b-5, only eleven 
people were convicted of insider trading from 1942 to 1984.64  However, the 
SEC waited until 1961 to categorize insider trading as a violation of Rule 
10b-5, which likely limited the number of criminal convictions for insider 
trading.65 
 
 54. Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2012)). 
 55. Pub. L. No. 73-110, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78 
(2012)); see also Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 1. 
 56. See Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 1–2. 
 57. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012). 
 58. See Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 2; Eisenberg, supra note 2. 
 59. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-355, at 13 (1983), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 
2286. 
 60. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934—Principles of Full Disclosure, SEC. & 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION HIST. SOC’Y, http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/it/ 
fullDisclosure_a.php [https:// perma.cc/H866-SRVT] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019). 
 61. Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 2; see 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2019). 
 62. See Lewis D. Lowenfels, Codification and Rule 10b-5, 23 VAND. L. REV. 591, 596 
(1970). 
 63. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
 64. 134 Cong. Rec. 23,601 (1988) (statement of Rep. Eckart). 
 65. See Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 3. 
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2.  Texas Gulf Sulphur’s Equal-Access Rule 
In the 1968 case SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,66 the Second Circuit 
adopted a rule from the earlier SEC decision Cady, Roberts & Co.67 and 
established a broad standard for insider trading liability.68  Texas Gulf 
Sulphur (TGS), a drilling company, discovered a mine in early November 
1963.69  TGS verified the drilling find in early April after completing a land 
acquisition program in the find area.70  Between November and the middle 
of April 1964, defendants’ ownership of TGS stock and call options 
increased dramatically and TGS issued stock options to $26 of its officers 
and employees.71  TGS’s stock price rose from $17 on November 15 to $36 
on April 16 (the day the find was announced) and to over $58 on May 15.72  
The SEC filed a complaint against certain TGS officers, directors, and 
employees and alleged violations of Rule 10b-5 because the defendants either 
purchased TGS stock or options on the basis of MNPI, shared the MNPI with 
other traders, or recommended the purchase of TGS stock to other traders.73  
TGS also issued a deceptive press release on April 12.74 
Hearing two defendants’ appeals of their convictions and the SEC’s 
appeals of the other dismissals, the Second Circuit interpreted the purpose of 
the Exchange Act to be the promotion of fairness in securities transactions 
and prevention of inequitable and unfair practices.75  The court adopted the 
Cady, Roberts & Co. rule that anyone in possession of MNPI must disclose 
the information before trading on it or abstain from trading.76  The court 
defined “materiality” as any information that a reasonable person would 
deem important in deciding a course of action for the transaction in 
question.77  The court held that Rule 10b-5 requires that all investors should 
have equal access to rewards and face identical market risks in securities 
transactions.78 
Although the Second Circuit established a broad “disclose or abstain” rule 
in Texas Gulf Sulphur, the Supreme Court in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. 
Green clarified that Rule 10b-5 violations still require manipulation or 
 
 66. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc). 
 67. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). 
 68. Donald C. Langevoort, From Texas Gulf Sulphur to Chiarella:  A Tale of Two Duties, 
71 SMU L. REV. 835, 836 (2018); see also Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 911 (finding 
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deception.79  Santa Fe Industries attempted to complete a merger with Kirby 
Lumber Corp.80  After Morgan Stanley appraised the Kirby stock at $125 per 
share, Santa Fe offered Kirby stockholders $150 per share.81  The Kirby 
shareholders sued and claimed that the stock was worth $772 per share based 
on physical assets and that Santa Fe violated Rule 10b-5 with its offer.82 
In evaluating the claim for fraud under Rule 10b-5, the Court defined 
manipulation as engaging in practices “that are intended to mislead investors 
by artificially affecting market activity.”83  The Court held that section 10(b) 
only regulates conduct involving manipulation or deception, and if neither 
are present, a claim of fraud or fiduciary breach does not state a cause of 
action under Rule 10b-5.84  Because Santa Fe’s offer lacked the necessary 
manipulation or deception, the Court dismissed the alleged Rule 10b-5 
violations and remanded for application of state law.85  Nothing in the 
Court’s opinion, however, addressed the Second Circuit’s equal access rule. 
3.  Chiarella’s Fiduciary Duty Rule 
In the 1980 case Chiarella v. United States, the Supreme Court considered 
issues of equal access and the necessity of a fiduciary duty to clarify the scope 
for insider trading liability.86  The defendant in the case, Vincent Chiarella, 
worked for a financial printer; his duties included handling announcements 
of corporate takeover bids.87  Although clients concealed the names of the 
takeover companies before sending documents to his employer, Chiarella 
still “deduce[d] the names of the target companies.”88  Chiarella never 
publicly disclosed his knowledge; instead, he bought stock in the target 
companies and sold the stock after the takeover attempts were announced.89  
After an SEC investigation, the Second Circuit upheld Chiarella’s conviction 
for violating section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.90  The Second Circuit held that 
anyone who regularly receives MNPI incurs an affirmative duty to disclose 
before using the information to trade securities.91 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed Chiarella’s 
conviction.92  In a strategic decision, the Justice Department chose not to 
present an argument in support of the Second Circuit’s holding regarding an 
affirmative duty to disclose.93  Instead, the government argued that Chiarella 
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misappropriated the information and “deceived the source of the 
information . . . because misappropriation itself triggers a duty to disclose.”94  
Because the government failed to submit the misappropriation argument to 
the jury during trial, the Supreme Court declined to review the argument on 
procedural grounds.95 
In its decision, the Supreme Court focused its discussion on the 
prerequisite fiduciary duty required to prove fraud through nondisclosure 
under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.96  Although the majority agreed 
with Justice Harry Blackmun’s dissent that section 10(b) acts as a flexible 
“catchall” provision,97 they found that fraud must be present to establish a 
section 10(b) violation.98  Chiarella did not owe a fiduciary duty to the sellers 
of the target company because he lacked any prior relationship with that 
company.99  Chiarella, therefore, owed no duty to disclose before trading:  a 
necessary element to make his silence fraudulent.100 
Upon examination of the language and legislative history of section 10(b), 
the Court found no evidence of congressional intent to create a general duty 
to forgo any actions based on MNPI.101  Accordingly, the Court held that 
mere possession of MNPI does not create a duty to disclose under section 
10(b).102  Because the trial judge only instructed the jury on Chiarella’s 
failure to disclose and not on his duty to anyone other than the selling 
company, the Court reversed his conviction.103  The Court also found that 
“not every instance of financial unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity 
under § 10(b).”104  An insider unfairly trading on a corporation’s MNPI in 
violation of a duty owed to that corporation became the basis for the 
“traditional” or “classical” theory of insider trading liability.105 
4.  Dirks Introduces the Personal Benefit Element 
In the 1983 case Dirks v. SEC, the SEC again attempted to expand the 
definition of insider trading to encompass situations that leave traders with 
unequal information, regardless of fiduciary duty.106  The SEC argued to 
affirm its censure of the defendant for aiding and abetting insider trading.107  
Raymond Dirks, a broker-dealer, received information from Ronald Secrist 
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who alleged that his former employer, Equity Funding of America, was 
engaging in fraudulent corporate practices.108  Secrist wanted Dirks to verify 
and disclose the allegations of fraud.109  Dirks corroborated the fraud and 
shared this information with several of his clients, who then sold their 
holdings of Equity Funding securities.110  Dirks also urged the Wall Street 
Journal to write a story and hoped that it would expose the fraud 
allegations.111  Using what has been criticized as terrible enforcement 
discretion,112 the SEC investigated Dirks and censured him for aiding and 
abetting securities fraud.113 
The Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit’s affirmation of Dirks’s 
censure.114  To support its censure, the SEC argued that anyone in possession 
of MNPI has a duty to disclose or abstain from trading on that information 
because tippees “inherit” the same duty as insiders for trading on MNPI.115  
The Court rejected the SEC’s broad view of insider trading liability and 
duty.116  The Court reaffirmed the principle from Chiarella that a duty to 
disclose only arises from a relationship between parties and not from a 
marketplace position that enables the acquisition of MNPI.117  The Court also 
reaffirmed that liability for Rule 10b-5 violations derives from unfairly using 
information intended only for corporate purposes and not for personal 
benefit.118  A tippee’s duty to disclose or abstain derives from an insider’s 
duty to disclose or abstain.119 
To help courts identify when a tippee unfairly trades and violates a duty to 
disclose, the Court added the personal benefit element for tippee insider 
trading liability as an objective requirement.120  The Court noted that to 
preserve a healthy market, the SEC recognizes that securities analysts must 
“ferret out” nonpublic information to make analytical judgments.121  
Nevertheless, the Court stated that analyst tippees cannot always trade on 
information received.122  In its attempt to draw a line between permissible 
and impermissible trades, the Court focused on whether tippers disclosed the 
information for an improper purpose.123  An improper purpose for the 
disclosure occurs when the tipper exploits the information for personal 
gain.124  The Court also provided examples of tipper personal benefits, 
 
 108. Id. at 648–49. 
 109. Id. at 649. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See id. 
 112. See Eisenberg, supra note 2. 
 113. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 650–52. 
 114. Id. at 652. 
 115. Id. at 651, 655–56. 
 116. See id. at 656–57. 
 117. Id. at 657–58. 
 118. Id. at 654. 
 119. Id. at 659. 
 120. Id. at 663. 
 121. Id. at 658–59. 
 122. Id. at 659. 
 123. See id. at 659–62. 
 124. Id. at 659. 
280 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
including pecuniary gain and reputational benefit.125  The Court listed certain 
circumstances that may create the inference of a personal benefit to the 
insider:  a relationship that suggests quid pro quo from the recipient or an 
intention to benefit a particular recipient.126  “The elements of fiduciary duty 
and exploitation of nonpublic information also exist when an insider makes 
a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend.”127 
Applying the personal benefit test to the case, the Supreme Court 
determined that Secrist disclosed the information to Dirks to expose 
corporate fraud.128  The Court found that Secrist “received no monetary or 
personal benefit for revealing Equity Funding’s secrets, nor was their 
purpose to make a gift of valuable information to Dirks.”129  The Court 
brushed aside the SEC’s fears that defendants could manufacture proper 
purposes for improper trades because the personal benefit test provides 
objective criteria to determine the scienter element for securities fraud.130  
Not only did the Supreme Court again reject the SEC’s equal access theory, 
but it also instituted the personal benefit requirement as an additional obstacle 
for the SEC to secure insider trading convictions.131 
B.  The SEC Wins the Long Game 
With its equal access theory now twice rebuffed by the Supreme Court, the 
SEC lobbied Congress, promulgated three new rules (10b-5-1, 10b-5-2, and 
Reg FD), and argued Supreme Court cases to expand insider trading 
liability.132  In response to public outrage from securities scandals in the 
1980s, Congress passed the Insider Trading Sanctions Act133 (ITSA) in 1984 
and the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act134 (ITSFEA) 
in 1988.  ITSA allowed treble damages and increased the maximum criminal 
fine for violations of the Exchange Act to $100,000.135  ITSFEA established 
a private cause of action for insider trading victims, created a bounty system 
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to reward informants with a percentage recovery of insider trading profits, 
increased the maximum fine to $1 million, and set the maximum jail term at 
ten years for insider trading.136 
Despite these expansions of liability, Congress refused to adopt the 
“misappropriation theory” that the Justice Department first argued in 
Chiarella.137  This theory, referenced by the dissent in Chiarella, proposes 
that because misappropriation triggers a duty to disclose, anyone who 
misappropriates MNPI deceives the source of the information.138  Instead, 
Congress largely deferred to the courts to continue developing insider trading 
law.139 
Part I.B.1 describes how the Supreme Court adopted the misappropriation 
theory.  Part I.B.2 analyzes how the SEC promulgated Reg FD to limit the 
practice of selective disclosure.  Part I.B.2 also explains how the SEC 
promulgated Rule 10b-5-2 to define relationships in situations where duties 
of trust or confidence exist to help guide application of the misappropriation 
theory. 
1.  O’Hagan Adopts Misappropriation Theory 
In the 1997 case United States v. O’Hagan,140 the SEC finally convinced 
the Supreme Court to adopt the misappropriation theory.141  The defendant, 
James O’Hagan, worked as a partner at a law firm.142  His firm briefly 
represented Grand Metropolitan PLC in 1988 in a potential tender offer for 
the Pillsbury Company.143  O’Hagan did not work on the Pillsbury matter, 
but he purchased call options and shares of Pillsbury stock beginning in 
August and September, respectively, before his firm withdrew from 
representing Grand Metropolitan in September.144  When Grand 
Metropolitan announced the tender offer in October, O’Hagan sold his call 
options and shares and made more than $4.3 million.145 
A jury convicted O’Hagan of seventeen counts of securities fraud, twenty 
counts of mail fraud, seventeen counts of fraudulent trading in connection 
with a tender offer, and three counts of violating federal money laundering 
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statutes.146  In a divided opinion, an Eighth Circuit panel reversed all of 
O’Hagan’s convictions.147  The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit’s 
decision.148 
In reinstating O’Hagan’s convictions, the Court distinguished between the 
classical theory and the misappropriation theory for insider trading 
liability.149  Per Chiarella, a violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 occurs 
under the classical theory “when a corporate insider trades in the securities 
of his corporation on the basis of [MNPI].”150  The classical theory applies 
to anyone who receives confidential information through a positional 
relationship with a corporation, including temporary fiduciaries such as 
attorneys.151  A violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 occurs under the 
misappropriation theory when someone “misappropriates confidential 
information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a fiduciary duty 
owed to the source of the information.”152  The Court stated that the two 
theories are complementary because the classical theory protects 
shareholders from corporate insider abuse and the misappropriation theory 
protects against abuse from outsiders with access to confidential 
information—but no fiduciary duty.153 
The Court found that misappropriation satisfies the deception requirement 
under section 10(b) because “[a] fiduciary who ‘[pretends] loyalty to the 
principal while secretly converting the principal’s information for personal 
gain,’‘dupes’ or defrauds the principal.”154  A corporation has the exclusive 
right to use confidential information and undisclosed misappropriations of 
this information constitute fraud similar to embezzlement.155  The Court 
limited the scope of liability and noted that “full disclosure forecloses 
liability under the misappropriation theory” because it eliminates deception 
of the information’s source.156  The Court found that O’Hagan’s failure to 
disclose his trades using the misappropriated information violated section 
10(b) and breached his duty to his firm and its client, Grand Metropolitan.157 
2.  Regulations Limit Disclosures and Define Duties of Trust or Confidence 
In August 2000, over three years after the O’Hagan decision, the SEC 
promulgated several regulations regarding disclosure, transactions involving 
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MNPI, and the applicability of the misappropriation theory.158  The SEC 
promulgated Reg FD to stop the practice of selective disclosure.159  Selective 
disclosure occurs when a corporation discloses information to certain traders, 
often institutional investors, who are likely to transact using that information 
without disclosing it to the general public.160  Reg FD requires that whenever 
issuers or their agents disclose MNPI to certain parties, they must publicly 
disclose the information simultaneously for intentional disclosures and 
promptly for unintentional disclosures.161  Reg FD attempted to strike a 
balance that minimized informed trading on intentionally disclosed material 
information without chilling securities analysts’ ability to perform 
information-seeking interviews.162 
The SEC promulgated Rule 10b5-2 to clarify to whom, and to which 
duties, the misappropriation theory applies.163  Paragraph b specifies when 
“duties of trust or confidence” exist, such as when the recipient of 
information agrees to keep information confidential, knows or reasonably 
should know that the disclosing party expects the recipient to maintain 
confidentiality, or receives the information from a spouse, parent, child, or 
sibling.164  Rule 10b5-2(b)(3), which covers information received from a 
spouse, parent, child, or sibling, includes a presumption for liability unless 
the receiver did not know or reasonably should not have known that the 
source expected the information to be kept confidential.165  Like Dirks’s list 
of personal benefits, this is a nonexhaustive list intended to help courts apply 
insider trading liability under the misappropriation theory.166 
C.  New Judicial Developments for Gift Theory 
Part I.C discusses the cases that the Supreme Court, Second Circuit, and 
Ninth Circuit have heard since 2014 regarding the necessary closeness of a 
tipper-tippee relationship to find a gift of MNPI to be personal benefit. 
1.  Newman Attempts a Heightened Standard 
After the 2008 recession, the SEC increased its focus on prosecuting hedge 
fund managers and employees.167  In United States v. Newman, the 
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government presented evidence that Todd Newman and Anthony Chiasson 
employed analysts who directly or indirectly exchanged information about 
companies’ earnings statements after obtaining the information from 
corporate insiders.168  Newman and Chiasson then traded on this information 
and earned $4 million for Newman’s managed funds and $68 million for 
Chiasson’s managed funds.169  Newman and Chiasson were several levels 
removed from the corporate insider tippers and each argued that the 
government presented no evidence that any tipper received a personal 
benefit.170  The district court rejected the defendants’ argument and proposed 
jury instructions that claimed that the Second Circuit’s decision in SEC v. 
Obus171 did not require explanation of a personal benefit to the tipper as a 
separate element for insider trading liability.172 
On appeal, the defendants raised multiple challenges to their convictions, 
including claims of insufficient evidence and erroneous jury instructions.173  
Clarifying the elements of tippee liability articulated in Dirks, the Second 
Circuit stated that “even in the presence of a tippers’ breach, a tippee is liable 
only if he knows or should have known of the breach.”174  The Second Circuit 
noted that the government did not identify any prior case where defendants 
were as remote as Newman and Chiasson and were held criminally liable.175  
While several people in the tipping chains previously knew each other and 
even exchanged career advice or went to church together, the Second Circuit 
found that these people were only casual acquaintances and that the 
circumstantial evidence did not permit the court to infer a personal benefit.176  
Furthermore, the prosecution presented no testimony that Newman and 
Chiasson knew or consciously avoided knowing that they had traded on 
information from insiders or that the insiders benefited from the 
disclosures.177  When combined with the defendants’ evidence showing that 
they had accurately modeled the earnings statements, the Second Circuit 
found that the government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendants had the intent to commit insider trading.178 
The Second Circuit worried that if it accepted the government’s evidence 
of a personal benefit, then “practically anything would qualify” as a personal 
benefit, which would nullify that element for liability.179  Instead, the Second 
Circuit attempted to clarify the gift example of a personal benefit from 
Dirks.180  The court held that a jury cannot infer a personal benefit from a 
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gift to a trading friend or relative “in the absence of proof of a meaningfully 
close personal relationship that generates an exchange that . . . represents at 
least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.”181  This 
two-element test established a heightened requirement for finding a personal 
benefit from a gift and spawned later appeals in Salman and Martoma II.182 
2.  Salman Restores Dirks 
In 2016, the Supreme Court in Salman v. United States183 accepted its first 
insider trading case in almost two decades.184  Maher Kara worked as an 
investment banker at Citigroup and his brother, Mounir “Michael” Kara, 
began trading on information that Maher shared with him.185  Michael even 
declined an offer from Maher for cash and preferred instead to receive the 
lucrative trading information.186  Michael then shared the tips with his 
brother-in-law, Bassam Salman.187  Using another relative who traded on his 
behalf, Salman made over $1.5 million on trades using Maher’s 
information.188  During Salman’s trial, the evidence at trial showed that 
Maher and Michael had a close relationship and that Salman knew Maher 
was supplying the information.189  The jury convicted Salman on all counts 
and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction despite Salman’s argument that 
the Ninth Circuit should adopt the heightened Newman personal benefit 
standard.190 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the tension between the 
Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit that stemmed from the Newman 
decision.191  The Supreme Court held that Salman’s actions were “in the 
heartland of Dirks’s rule concerning gifts” and adhered to the Dirks personal 
benefit precedent.192  Because Salman conceded that the original disclosure 
from Maher to Michael constituted a gift, the Court implied that this made 
everyone in the tipping chain liable and provided enough evidence to sustain 
Salman’s conviction.193  The Court also repudiated the second element of the 
Newman test and held that requiring a tipper to receive something pecuniary 
or similarly valuable in nature was inconsistent with Dirks.194 
 
 181. Id. 
 182. See generally Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016); Martoma II, 894 F.3d 
64 (2d Cir. 2018). 
 183. 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016). 
 184. See Austin J. Green, Note, (Beyond) Family Ties:  Remote Tippees in a Post-Salman 
Era, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2769, 2771 (2017). 
 185. Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 424. 
 186. Id. at 428. 
 187. Id. at 423–24. 
 188. Id. at 424. 
 189. Id. at 424–25. 
 190. Id. at 425; see United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 191. Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 425. 
 192. Id. at 429. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 428. 
286 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
3.  Martoma I:  Abrogating Newman Entirely 
After the Supreme Court in Salman partially abrogated the Newman 
holding without substantially changing insider trading law, the Second 
Circuit was given another opportunity to revise its standard for inferring 
personal benefits from gifts in Martoma I.195  Mathew Martoma managed an 
investment portfolio focused on pharmaceutical and health-care companies 
and paid Dr. Sidney Gilman, the chair of a safety committee monitoring the 
clinical trials of a new drug, approximately $1000 per hour for approximately 
forty-three consulting sessions.196  Martoma made trades in advance of the 
announcement of the results of the trials that resulted in gains of 
approximately $80 million and averted losses of over $194 million.197  The 
jury convicted Martoma of two counts of securities fraud;198 he appealed, 
claiming insufficient evidence and inadequate jury instructions under the 
Newman standard.199 
A three-judge panel heard Martoma’s appeal and issued a majority opinion 
affirming his convictions in August 2017.200  The majority rejected 
Martoma’s claim that there was insufficient evidence of Dr. Gilman’s 
pecuniary gain even though Dr. Gilman did not charge Martoma for the two 
sessions in which Dr. Gilman released the study data.201  The court 
determined that the ongoing quid pro quo theory—that “Dr. Gilman regularly 
disclosed confidential information in exchange for fees”—could lead a 
rational trier of fact to find proof of all insider trading liability elements 
“under a pecuniary quid pro quo theory.”202 
The majority relied on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Salman to reject 
Martoma’s inadequate jury instructions claim and abrogate Newman’s first 
element that required a “meaningfully close personal relationship.”203  The 
majority argued that Dirks never limited personal benefits to gifts from 
“meaningfully close” friends and family members.204  The majority held that 
Salman allowed an inference of a personal benefit from a gift whenever an 
insider discloses information with the expectation that the tippee will trade 
using the information.205  The majority found that the new rule would not 
apply to all disclosures, such as inadvertent or whistleblowing disclosures, 
and did not eliminate the personal benefit rule.206  The majority concluded 
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that “the district court’s instruction on gifts with the goal of developing 
friendships . . . did not constitute ‘obvious’ error.”207  Even if the instruction 
created an obvious error, the court held that the evidence of Dr. Gilman’s 
financial benefit from his relationship with Martoma did not impair 
Martoma’s substantial rights.208 
In her dissent, Judge Rosemary S. Pooler contended that the jury 
instructions were erroneous and that Newman could be abrogated without an 
en banc hearing.209  Judge Pooler claimed that the majority’s holding 
exceeded the “friends and family” limitation on finding a personal benefit 
from a gift—established by Dirks—and instead applied gift theory to any 
person.210  The dissent also argued that “[w]hat counts as a ‘gift’ is vague 
and subjective,”211 and that the majority provided no further guidance on the 
matter.212  Judge Pooler argued that the lack of guidance for juries to find 
that a disclosure is a gift forces juries to make arbitrary and subjective 
decisions.213  This undermines the objective intent element of the personal 
benefit requirement.214  The dissent worried that the new rule would allow 
the government to rely exclusively on circumstantial evidence rather than 
objective facts in insider trading prosecutions.215  The dissent held that if 
construed broadly, “the term ‘gift’ could cover nearly any disclosure, and 
thus eliminate the personal benefit rule entirely.”216  Because the dissent 
argued that the first element of the Newman test still applied, it concluded 
that the jury instructions were plainly erroneous and not harmless.217 
4.  Martoma II:  Newman Lives 
Ten months after the initial opinion, the three-judge panel issued an 
amended opinion and agreed that the jury instructions were inconsistent with 
Newman but for different reasons than Mathew Martoma proposed.218  The 
majority no longer rejected the “meaningfully close personal relationship” 
element from Newman.219  Instead, the majority found that the jury 
instructions were erroneous because they allowed the jury to find a personal 
benefit from a gift without finding “either that tipper and tippee shared a 
relationship suggesting quid pro quo or that the tipper gifted confidential 
information with the intention to benefit the tippee.”220  The majority 
nevertheless upheld Martoma’s conviction because the government 
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presented sufficient evidence that Dr. Gilman benefited through his quid pro 
quo relationship with Martoma and through his intention to benefit Martoma 
with the disclosure.221 
The majority’s amended decision resulted primarily from a new 
interpretation of the language in Dirks describing personal benefits.  The 
majority argued that the comma separating the “intention to benefit a 
particular recipient” phrase from the “relationship suggesting quid pro quo” 
phrase in Dirks severs any connection between them.222  Therefore, the court 
held that the language regarding an intention to benefit should be read 
independently from the language regarding relationships.223  The majority’s 
holding allows proof of “a personal benefit with objective evidence of the 
tipper’s intent, without requiring in every case some additional evidence of 
the tipper-tippee relationship.”224 
The Martoma II majority argued that Newman provided substantial 
guidance for defining a “meaningfully close personal relationship” as 
requiring that an insider intend to benefit the tippee or have a relationship 
that suggests a quid pro quo.225  The majority interpreted Newman as limiting 
the application of gift theory to only situations where one of the freestanding 
personal benefits described above also applied.226  Using the above 
interpretation, the majority agreed that Martoma received erroneous jury 
instructions regarding the application of the personal benefit test; however, 
the error did not impact Martoma’s substantial rights.227  The majority argued 
that the district court properly instructed the jury on both of the freestanding 
personal benefits necessary to satisfy the new personal benefit test.228  The 
Second Circuit majority found that a rational trier of fact would have found 
either the quid pro quo relationship or Dr. Gilman’s intent to benefit Martoma 
sufficient.229 
Judge Pooler again dissented, arguing that the majority redefined Newman 
in subjective terms in derogation of circuit precedent.230  Judge Pooler 
interpreted the personal benefit language from Dirks differently than the 
majority and claimed that an intention to benefit a particular recipient also 
requires evidence suggesting a quid pro quo relationship.231  In contrast, gifts 
of MNPI operate as a distinct type of personal benefit because evidence that 
suggests a quid pro quo relationship is not necessary for certain friendships 
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and familial relationships.232  According to Judge Pooler, the majority’s 
interpretation of Dirks limits proof of necessary objective facts to the 
disclosure of MNPI but not to facts indicating that the tipper benefitted from 
the relationship with the tippee.233 
The dissent also argued that the majority’s interpretation conflicted with a 
reading of Dirks as a whole and that a tipper’s intention to benefit a tippee 
does not qualify as a personal benefit for the tipper.234  As in her dissent in 
Martoma I, Judge Pooler believed that the majority’s amended opinion 
replaced an objective test with a test that requires a subjective determination 
of an intention to benefit.235  The personal benefit test purports to determine 
the tipper’s purpose for the tip; however, the prosecution must only prove the 
personal benefit, not the purpose.236  Focusing on the closeness of the 
relationship between tipper and tippee provides better objective evidence that 
disclosures to friends and relatives are gifts than attempting to determine the 
tipper’s intentions.237  Because the instructions did not ask the jury whether 
Dr. Gilman and Martoma shared a likely quid pro quo relationship or were 
close enough friends that the information could be a gift, the dissent found 
that the instructions were erroneous and not harmless.238 
D.  Post-Newman Relationship Personal Benefit Theories 
Legal scholars continue to debate how courts should interpret the closeness 
of the relationship between tipper and tippee in the personal benefit analysis.  
Abigail Bush argues in favor of keeping the “meaningfully close personal 
relationship” element from Newman as the correct definition of friendship 
for personal benefits derived from gifts.239  Bush argues that a close 
relationship provides indirect benefits to the tipper because it creates a 
reasonable assumption that the tippee will share prosperity with the tipper 
and because the relationship creates a feeling of obligation for the tipper to 
provide for the tippee’s security and stability.240  Without such a relationship, 
no reason exists to assume that either of the above benefits exist.241  Forcing 
juries to determine if tippers reasonably expect tippees to trade on 
information establishes a subjective, rather than objective, standard.242 
Bush claims that personal benefits derived from gifts represent “the 
minimum benefit that a tipper must gain to even be considered to have 
personally benefitted from his disclosure of inside information.”243  Because 
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gift theory under Dirks represents the floor for personal benefits, Bush argues 
for interpreting the friendship requirement to confine liability to a narrower 
set of relationships.244  Bush identifies factors which help determine whether 
an appropriately close friendship exists: a history of engaging in social 
activities directly together, a history of assisting one another with personal 
issues, and the length of the relationship and frequency of interactions.245  
Bush believes that courts can use prior case law to determine the sufficiency 
of friendship through specific social activities as well as actions that show a 
history of support.246  Prior cases also indicate that a higher frequency of 
interactions over a longer period of time will support a finding of 
friendship.247  These factors limit inferences for gift theory application and 
help prevent the eradication of boundaries for disclosures established by 
Dirks.248 
Similar to Bush, Sara Almousa believes that courts must clarify the 
relationships in which liability should attach for a personal benefit.249  
Almousa identifies two ways to determine appropriately close relationships 
that satisfy the personal benefit requirement:  either the tipper must receive 
an objective gain from disclosing the tip or the information must strengthen 
the tipper’s relationship with any tippee who gains from using the 
information.250  Almousa claims that her proposed standard shifts the focus 
away from a relationship benefit between the original tipper and tippee and 
instead focuses on whether any tippee in the chain benefitted.251  Almousa 
concedes that her new standard would not resolve the Newman issue of 
remoteness from the original tipper and may even make convicting remote 
tippees more difficult.252  Nevertheless, Almousa argues that her standard 
satisfies the objective purpose for the personal benefit requirement and 
“potentially eliminates the need for prosecutors to prove that tippees knew 
the information came from corporate insiders.”253 
II.  APPLYING INSIDER TRADING LAW AND PERSONAL BENEFIT TESTS 
As the cases and theories discussed in Parts I.C and I.D demonstrate, courts 
struggle to consistently define and apply tests for nonpecuniary personal 
benefits.  This struggle stems at least in part from attempts to create objective 
criteria for liability standards and limit what juries may infer from 
circumstantial evidence.254  Additionally, courts must attempt to balance the 
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potentially conflicting goals of the Exchange Act.255  Scholars on one side 
argue that insider trading regulations that promote efficiency in capital 
markets and allow more forms of informed trading best accomplish the goals 
of the Exchange Act.256  Those on the other side argue that regulations that 
protect investors from harm and promote fair and beneficial securities 
activities best accomplish the Exchange Act’s goals.257 
To determine how to establish the best insider trading liability standards, 
this Note reviews rationales and theories regarding economic efficiency, 
accurate pricing, market fairness, and investor harm.  Part II.A focuses on 
theories arguing that insider trading prohibitions regulate securities 
transactions inefficiently.  Part II.B reviews theories that identify the harm 
from insider trading and distinguish fair and beneficial securities activities 
from harmful uses of MNPI. 
A.  “Efficient Capital Markets” Theories 
Even prior to the Second Circuit’s decision in Texas Gulf Sulphur, Henry 
Manne, a legal and economic scholar, suggested that prohibitions on insider 
trading restrict the development of efficient capital markets.258  Specifically, 
Manne makes two economic arguments against enforcement of insider 
trading laws.259  First, insider trading helps price securities more efficiently 
so markets reflect the true value of the securities more accurately.260  Second, 
insider trading does not significantly harm long-term securities investors.261  
Manne’s two arguments combine to suggest that permitting more insider 
trading benefits long-term investors because investors receive more accurate 
prices, which reduces market unfairness for securities transactions.  Part 
II.A.1 reviews claims that insider trading helps to more accurately price 
securities.  Part II.A.2 presents arguments that insider trading does not harm 
long-term investors. 
1.  Accurate Pricing 
Manne’s first argument that insider trading helps to more accurately price 
securities finds widespread support; Manne himself claims that almost 
nobody disagrees “that insider trading does always push the price of a stock 
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in the correct direction.”262  Matt Levine, a columnist for Bloomberg, agrees 
that insider trading helps markets function more efficiently and better 
informs prices.263  Stephen Bainbridge believes that when a corporation 
withholds material information, “the market can no longer accurately price 
its securities.”264  Merritt Fox, Lawrence Glosten, and Gabriel Rauterberg 
agree that “informed trading leads to more accurate share prices,” which 
increases efficient economic allocation of resources.265  However, these 
experts also argue that informed trading reduces market liquidity, which 
creates inefficiencies and increases costs for securities transactions.266 
In accord with views of the scholars above, the Supreme Court in Basic 
Inc. v. Levinson267 adopted the “fraud-on-the-market” theory, which believes 
that securities markets should accurately reflect all material public 
information in the price of the security.268  Any material misstatement that 
creates investor reliance and inaccurately affects the price of a security allows 
a cause of action under Rule 10b-5.269  The fraud-on-the-market theory 
allows investors to rely on the accuracy of stock prices, which corresponds 
with the goals of the Exchange Act to ensure fair pricing mechanisms for 
securities, fair dealing among all investors, and open and orderly securities 
markets.270 
In Basic, Combustion Engineering, Inc. discussed a possible merger with 
Basic Inc.271  Between 1977 and 1978, Basic made three separate public 
statements denying any merger negotiations.272  Basic finally suspended 
trading on its stock and announced the merger and price in December 
1978.273  Basic shareholders who sold their shares after the first denial but 
before the merger announcement filed a class-action suit and claimed the 
misstatements violated section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.274 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve circuit splits regarding the 
standard of materiality and the presumption of reliance for the shareholder 
class.275  The Court found that requiring shareholder plaintiffs to prove a 
change of action due to the material misstatements “would place an 
unnecessarily unrealistic evidentiary burden on the Rule 10b–5 plaintiff who 
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has traded on an impersonal market.”276  The Court noted that market 
professionals usually consider most material public information—and this 
affects stock prices.277  The Court further believed that all investors rely on 
market integrity because an opposite presumption would lead to no public 
investments in the stock market due to fears of rigged stock prices.278  
Because announcements of material public information often affect stock 
prices, the fraud-on-the-market theory presumes reliance on the 
misstatements and posits that market prices should reflect the integrity and 
accuracy of a security’s value.279 
In Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc.,280  the Supreme Court 
denied another challenge to investor reliance on stock price accuracy and 
reaffirmed the fraud-on-the-market theory.281  Erica P. John Fund 
shareholders filed a class action suit alleging that Halliburton misrepresented 
its potential liability in asbestos litigation.282  Halliburton pushed to overturn 
Basic’s presumption of reliance, but the Supreme Court rejected this 
argument and found that Halliburton relied on the economic arguments 
rejected in Basic.283  The Court also found that Basic did not presume 
complete efficiency in capital markets and the rebuttable presumption of 
reliance accounted for the degree of market efficiency.284 
Halliburton argued that value investors, who attempt to purchase 
undervalued stocks or sell overvalued stocks, provide a counterexample to 
the fraud-on-the-market theory and rebut the presumption that investors rely 
on stock prices that accurately reflect the value of securities.285  While the 
Court acknowledged that value investors exist, most uninformed investors 
still rely on the presumption that the stock price of a security will reflect all 
material public information.286 
By preserving the fraud-on-the-market theory in the above cases, the 
Supreme Court emphasized the importance of stock price accuracy for 
uninformed investors.  As noted above, a regulatory system that encourages 
the most accurate pricing of securities corresponds with the goals of the 
Exchange Act.287  Fraud-on-the-market depends on material public 
announcements before the stock price adjusts and current jurisprudence does 
not require companies to disclose all material information.288 
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Allowing more insider trading would accelerate the accurate reporting of 
securities prices.  In contrast with rapid price changes following public 
announcements of material information, allowing insider trading requires no 
public announcement, and each trade gradually moves the price closer to the 
correct value of the security.289  Insider trading may also reduce agency costs 
by giving more market information to investors faster than regulated 
disclosures.290  A return to the Texas Gulf Sulphur equal access rule for 
MNPI may not increase disclosure because insiders can still refrain from 
trading to avoid making negative disclosures.291  Investors prefer to obtain 
as much accurate information as soon as possible because more information 
can help investors make better trades.292  Allowing more insider trading by 
creating heightened tests for finding a tipper personal benefit could increase 
perceptions of rigged stock markets, but the information and accurate pricing 
benefits may outweigh these investor fears. 
2.  Investor Harm 
Manne’s second argument relies on a belief that a long-term investor 
suffers no immediate damage when trading anonymously with an insider who 
has MNPI.293  Bainbridge supports this argument because in an impersonal 
market, the investor makes an independent decision to buy or sell the security 
regardless of the fact that an insider acts on the other side of the 
transaction.294  Bainbridge concedes that the investor may not transact if 
given access to the same information that the insider possesses, but securities 
lawmakers have been unwilling to require immediate disclosure of material 
information in all circumstances.295  In Stuart Green and Matthew Kugler’s 
study of the general public,296 the authors found that the subjects “were 
unable to isolate the victim in one case from the victim in another.”297  The 
authors concluded that rationales for banning insider trading cause confusion 
for both lay people and legal professionals.298  If damage from insider trading 
cannot be consistently identified, then this could cause issues for consistently 
applying insider trading standards.  Manne believes that harm from insider 
trading occurs more frequently in theoretical literature than in the actual 
market and this renders investor-protection benefits irrelevant for insider 
trading regulations.299  Furthermore, diversified portfolios reduce risks to 
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individual investors and efficient capital markets establish rates of return that 
reflect risk of investment.300 
Even if insider trading harms individual investors, the current insider 
trading jurisprudence still leaves gaps that do not benefit or protect 
investors.301  Donald Langevoort believes that insider trading “is not 
deceptive in the way we today insist on for 10b-5 liability.”302  He notes that 
Chiarella overrules Texas Gulf Sulphur’s equal access principle but still 
ignores the deception requirement problem for Rule 10b-5 liability.303  
Donna Nagy claims that the personal benefit element does not include or 
define many deceptive breaches of the duty of loyalty as illegal forms of 
tipping.304  One wrongful type of permissible trade occurs when a fiduciary 
discloses his intention to trade on the MNPI to the source.305  Similar to 
Nagy, Matthew Guttentag argues that a personal benefit test is underinclusive 
because situations may arise where deceptive conduct occurs but no personal 
benefit or breach of fiduciary duty exists.306  Current insider trading 
jurisprudence represents a complex patchwork approach that does not cover 
all types of insider trading or MNPI tipping.307  Attempts to establish a 
system that prevents all types of improper trades or requires blanket 
disclosures would cause huge issues for the administration and enforcement 
of regulations.308  Investors may face more harm from increased tax 
expenditures for broader enforcement of regulations than from damages due 
to insider trading. 
If investors perceive harm from insider trading while conducting securities 
transactions, members of the general public may lose confidence in securities 
markets and withdraw participation altogether.309  John P. Anderson argues 
against claims that a loss of confidence in securities markets produces a 
chilling effect on investors’ willingness to participate because these claims 
must be proven rather than assumed.310  Anderson cites a poll conducted in 
1986 after an insider trading scandal; the poll’s responses showed that 
although 67 percent of respondents believed that Wall Street commonly 
engaged in insider trading, 55 percent stated that they would trade on an 
inside tip.311  This suggests that while a majority of the general public 
 
 300. Scott, supra note 291, at 809. 
 301. See generally Michael D. Guttentag, Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 69 
FLA. L. REV. 519 (2017); Langevoort, supra note 68; Donna M. Nagy, Beyond Dirks:  
Gratuitous Tipping and Insider Trading, 42 J. CORP. L. 1 (2016). 
 302. Langevoort, supra note 68, at 840. 
 303. Id. at 848. 
 304. Nagy, supra note 301, at 48. 
 305. Id. at 52. 
 306. Guttentag, supra note 301, at 565. 
 307. William K. S. Wang, Stock Market Insider Trading:  Victims, Violators and 
Remedies—Including an Analogy to Fraud in the Sale of a Used Car with a Generic Defect, 
45 VILL. L. REV. 27, 66 (2000). 
 308. Scott, supra note 291, at 812. 
 309. John P. Anderson, Insider Trading and the Myth of Market Confidence, 56 WASH. U. 
J.L. & POL’Y 1, 1 (2018). 
 310. Id. at 2. 
 311. Id. at 5–6. 
296 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
believes insider trading occurs frequently, this will not stop most people from 
participating in securities markets. 
Bainbridge argues that without proof of investor injury, insider trading 
should not undermine investor confidence in securities markets.312  Anderson 
claims that empirical data does not support market confidence rationales for 
insider trading bans.313  Anderson also anecdotally refers to Japan, which 
enacted insider trading regulations in the 1980s and subsequently suffered a 
market collapse and decrease in market liquidity.314  Anderson acknowledges 
that a myriad of causes led to the collapse but uses this as a counterexample 
to the suggestion that insider trading regulations inspire market confidence 
and encourage individual investment.315 
Instead of protecting investors, establishing fair markets, and encouraging 
public participation in securities transactions, insider trading regulations may 
have the opposite effect.  Regulations that ban insider trading may reduce the 
amount of accurate information available for investors, thereby reducing 
investors’ desire to invest and, in turn, reducing available capital for efficient 
market allocation.316  Although allowing insider trading may unfairly benefit 
traders using MNPI to transact with uninformed investors, all investors 
would still receive more information sooner and would trade using more 
accurate pricing.  Further, allowing insider trading might not change 
investors’ perceptions of market unfairness.  As a result, insider trading 
regulations with tests that more easily find a personal benefit for a tipper may 
negatively impact the development of open and efficient capital markets. 
B.  Beneficial Regulation and Protection Theories 
Contrary to the potential benefits identified above of permitting insider 
trading, insider trading can potentially harm individual investors and 
negatively impact securities markets by increasing price spreads and 
reducing liquidity.  Part II.B.1 describes socially desirable and undesirable 
forms of informed trading, the economic impact of desirable and undesirable 
trading, and how current regulations work to prohibit undesirable or permit 
desirable types of trading.  Part II.B.1 also analyzes a proposal to reverse the 
evidentiary burden, which requires the defendant to prove that no personal 
benefit came from disclosure in order to prohibit more undesirable trades.  
Part II.B.2 reviews William Wang’s analogy that compares insider trading to 
a generic car defect for one make and model and argues that insider trading 
causes harm to specific but anonymous individuals. 
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1.  Market Fairness and Desirable Informed Trading 
While ITSA was under consideration in Congress in 1983, the House 
Committee on Energy and Commerce submitted a report that stated that 
unlawful use of MNPI is distinguishable from legitimate and beneficial 
actions of securities professionals.317  New regulations should not inhibit any 
legitimate analytical activities.318  Modeling earnings, ferreting out 
information, and interviewing corporate officers and insiders represent 
legitimate analytical activities conducted by securities professionals, and the 
SEC agrees that these types of analyses help preserve a healthy market.319  
Courts, the SEC, and Congress face a continuing challenge to create a 
regulatory and enforcement system that prevents unlawful uses of MNPI for 
securities transactions while still preserving analysts’ ability to conduct 
legitimate and beneficial activities. 
Fox, Glosten, and Rauterberg suggest that the real injury from insider 
trading occurs from reduced liquidity, and such injury occurs regardless of 
whether a tipper receives a personal benefit.320  Fox and his coauthors 
support “fundamental value trading” as socially desirable, and they define 
fundamental value trading as gathering and analyzing pieces of public 
information to make a superior pricing assessment, which increases 
economic efficiency.321  Fundamental value trading helps incentivize new 
information through stock profits and improves stock price accuracy over 
time.322  However, the authors conclude that other forms of informed trading, 
such as announcement trading and insider trading, are socially undesirable 
because they reduce liquidity, reduce fundamental value trading, allocate 
resources inefficiently, and misallocate risks.323  The authors distinguish 
undesirable trades based on issuer-generated material information from 
socially desirable trades based on information from non-issuers.324 
Based on these desirable goals, Fox, Glosten, and Rauterberg analyzed 
current insider trading regulations and determined that Rule 10b-5 does not 
prohibit fundamental value trading.325  For insider trading, the authors agree 
that a personal benefit test combined with Reg FD operates as the best way 
to convert “an anti-fraud rule into a policy-based regulation of informed 
trading capable of protecting analyst interviews.”326  However, the authors 
also believe that this test too often protects indirect tippees who execute 
undesirable trades.327  To resolve this problem, the authors propose that 
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tippers and tippees must provide persuasive evidence that the disclosure was 
not for a Dirks-style personal benefit.328 
The purpose for reversing the evidentiary burden onto the defendants 
stems from obstacles in proving a personal benefit through a quid pro quo 
relationship.329  Fox and his coauthors argue that evidence establishing a quid 
pro quo benefit is hard to obtain.330  Tipping chains complicate the issue 
because the government must then prove the indirect tippee knew of the quid 
pro quo relationship.331  By contrast, proving a personal benefit through a 
gift does not present a significant obstacle.332  For most gift cases, the 
prosecution usually must only prove that a relationship exists in order to 
show a personal benefit and, as in Salman, indirect tippees will be liable if 
they knew of the relationship.333  The authors’ proposed burden reversal 
would aid prosecutions for insider trading and deter more undesirable trades 
from occurring while still protecting analysts’ ability to conduct interviews 
for fundamental value trading.334  However, others argue against easing 
liability requirements and protest that the elements of insider trading liability 
should not cater to prosecutorial goals.335 
2.  Investor Protection 
Although Manne and other scholars believe that individual investors suffer 
no harm from insider trading,336 William Wang argues that a general harm 
exists.337  Each act of insider trading causes harm to at least one individual 
trader, but the victims are anonymous and cannot be identified.338 
Wang analogizes the injury from insider trading to a generic car defect for 
all cars of a certain model, like a 2019 Sedan sold by the Car Company.339  
In such a scenario, an insider at the Car Company knows about the generic 
defect (thus possessing MNPI) and sells her 2019 Sedan to a car dealer at the 
existing market rate before the generic defect becomes publicly known and 
causes the price for the 2019 Sedan to drop.340  The dealer may also sell a 
2019 Sedan to another buyer before the defect becomes known.341  After the 
announcement of the defect, the market price for all 2019 Sedans drops and 
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the buyer now possesses less valuable property.342  The buyer appears to be 
the victim as the transaction harms the buyer because the purchase price did 
not reflect the value of the car, but the buyer is not definitively the victim.343  
The buyer might have purchased a 2019 Sedan even if the Car Company 
insider never sold her 2019 Sedan upon learning the MNPI about the 
defect.344  As a result, the buyer may have been stuck with a less valuable car 
regardless of the insider’s nondisclosure and insider trading violation.345 
Alternatively, assume that the dealer buys the car from the insider before 
the defect becomes known.346  The dealer chooses to lower the price on all 
2019 Sedans to increase sales and decrease inventory.347  Although a buyer 
of a 2019 Sedan may not purchase the insider’s car, the dealer’s decreased 
prices to reduce inventory may have incentivized the buyer to purchase a 
2019 Sedan.348  Because all 2019 Sedans have the same defect, the induced 
buyer becomes the victim of the insider’s sale.349  Instead of inducing a 
buyer, the dealer’s lower price for 2019 Sedans may preempt a potential 
seller from selling her 2019 Sedan.350  This delay in selling may cause the 
preempted seller to keep her 2019 Sedan until the defect becomes publicly 
known, which makes the seller the victim.351  If the dealer’s price reductions 
do not induce a buyer or preempt a seller, then the dealer holds a greater 
inventory of 2019 Sedans than anticipated, and the dealer becomes the victim 
after public announcement of the defect.352 
In the final hypothetical, the dealer, an induced buyer, or a preempted 
seller may all be victims depending on how they act and react to each other, 
but only one victim actually exists from the sale of the insider’s car.353  To 
determine the actual victim, one must know the price the dealer would have 
charged for 2019 Sedans without buying the insider’s car and “how the public 
would have reacted to these prices.”354  Such information is merely 
speculative rather than known with certainty.355 
This hypothetical translates to securities trades involving insider 
trading.356  Each instance of insider trading affects the trading price for the 
securities and creates at least one induced buyer or preempted seller.357  
General knowledge that insider trading occurs in markets may cause stock 
prices to decrease to help compensate buyers for the risk of being victims of 
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insider trading for each trade.358  Despite this potential reduction in stock 
prices, investors do not share insider trading losses equally and an insider 
trading victim bears a disproportionate harm from the trade.359  This 
corresponds to the last car hypothetical where the property of just one of the 
parties (the dealer, induced buyer, or preempted seller) loses value after 
announcement of the public defect.360 
Although specific yet anonymous victims exist for each instance of insider 
trading, investors who trade more frequently face disproportionate risks from 
insider trading.361  The risk of becoming a victim of insider trading correlates 
to the frequency at which one trades.362  Securities professionals and market-
makers who trade more frequently may pass these risks onto other investors 
by widening their spreads for trades.363  The increased spreads reduce the 
general public’s potential profit and may deter people from investing, which 
reduces market liquidity for securities.364 
Because insider trading can harm anonymous investors, increase investing 
costs for all investors through larger transaction spreads, and deter 
investments in securities, regulations that limit insider trading can help curb 
these negative effects.  Increased price spreads to offload risks of insider 
trading may make securities prices less accurate compared to the value of the 
securities.365  Although decreased prices for securities or increased spreads 
can limit risk or partially compensate victims, victims still disproportionately 
bear the costs and these measures can interfere with the efficient function of 
capital markets.366  Because of the negative effects of insider trading noted 
above, securities investors need regulations to limit the harm from insider 
trading transactions.  Tests that more easily find a tipper’s personal benefit 
can accomplish this goal. 
The contrast between the efficient capital markets theories and the investor 
protection and market fairness theories shows the disagreement among 
scholars over how to implement the most efficient and fair insider trading 
regulatory system.  The type of regulatory system affects how courts should 
apply personal benefit tests for tippee insider trading liability.  Tests that 
make it harder to find a tipper’s personal benefit may help increase stock 
price accuracy, give more information to investors faster, and encourage 
public participation in capital markets without harming specific investors.367  
However, this may also increase perceptions of rigged securities markets.368  
By contrast, tests that use parameters that more easily show a personal benefit 
can reduce the general market harm from insider trading, encourage socially 
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desirable securities transactions, and prevent trades that reduce market 
liquidity while still improving stock price accuracy by allowing fundamental 
value trading.369  However, more liberal personal benefit tests may establish 
underinclusive or overinclusive standards for insider trading liability and 
enforcement, and administration costs may exceed any benefits of reduced 
insider trading.370  This Note’s solution maintains much of the existing 
jurisprudence, including the Dirks personal benefit requirement, while 
harmonizing the applications of tests used for personal benefits involving a 
gift or an intention to benefit a particular recipient.371 
III.  NEW TESTS FOR NONPECUNIARY PERSONAL BENEFITS 
This Note argues that different factual situations support the need for two 
distinct tests for nonpecuniary personal benefits:  one test for gifts and one 
test for an intention to benefit a particular recipient.  The two tests would 
operate as complementary theories of liability, similar to the classical and 
misappropriation theories.  The new test for finding a personal benefit from 
a gift of MNPI would apply to all people, not just close friends or family, and 
would require prosecutors to show evidence of the tipper’s intention to gift 
the MNPI.  The new test for intention to benefit a particular recipient 
establishes a rebuttable presumption of legitimacy for any disclosure.  This 
Note also recommends that courts should instruct juries that tipper personal 
benefits are a separate and necessary element of insider trading liability. 
Currently, the Second Circuit requires a meaningfully close personal 
relationship for tippee liability under gift theory, but this creates an 
underinclusive test.372  For example, if an insider shares MNPI with a 
stranger on the street who then trades on that information, the stranger likely 
would not face criminal liability under Newman because no meaningfully 
close personal relationship exists.  In this example, arguing that the tip 
intended to benefit the stranger provides more support for liability than 
arguing that the tipper shared the MNPI as a gift.  By invoking the two 
distinct tests proposed in this Note, prosecutors would be able to pursue more 
instances of improper disclosures that result in insider trading. 
Part III.A identifies and explains the new test for finding a personal benefit 
from a gift.  Part III.B identifies and explains the new test for finding an 
intention to benefit a particular recipient.  Part III.C then analyzes how each 
of the new tests promotes economic efficiency and stock price accuracy while 
still protecting investors and fairness in securities markets. 
A.  Focusing on Scienter for Gifts 
Starting with gifts of MNPI, this Note argues that a new test for finding 
that a gift conferred a personal benefit should focus on a scienter element—
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that the tipper intended to give a gift—and not on the closeness of the 
relationship between tipper and tippee.  The Dirks personal benefit test 
intended to establish objective criteria for improper disclosures.373  Standards 
that focus on either the tipper’s intent to give a gift or on finding a sufficiently 
close relationship between tipper and tippee both involve subjective 
determinations of fact.  Determining the tipper’s intent to give a gift requires 
a subjective finding of the tipper’s state of mind.  A determination regarding 
the closeness of the tipper-tippee relationship to infer a gift is also subjective.  
Because both standards require subjective findings, this Note makes no 
attempt to evaluate which standard operates more objectively.  However, 
determining a tipper’s intent to gift information more closely aligns with 
Dirks’s overall goal of distinguishing between improper and proper 
disclosures.  This new test extends liability beyond just close friends and 
family and applies to any tippees who receive MNPI as a gift from a tipper. 
Many criminal statutes require mens rea determinations and juries can 
usually infer the defendant’s intent from her actions.  Insider trading laws 
should also allow juries to weigh evidence and infer intent.  Juries must 
weigh the evidence presented and evaluate arguments to determine their 
credibility.  To help a jury find the tipper’s intent, the following list provides 
some examples of actions that suggest an intent to gift the MNPI. 
If the tippee requests the information in lieu of cash, as happened in 
Salman between Michael and Maher, then the jury should infer the tipper’s 
intent to give a gift.374  If shortly after completing the trade and realizing the 
profit, the tippee loans or gives the tipper more than 10 percent of the profits 
from the trade, the jury should infer an intent to gift the MNPI.  If the tippee 
sends the tipper any nonmonetary item in exchange for the information, then 
the jury should infer the tipper’s intent to give a gift.  If the tipper discloses 
the information close to the recipient’s birthday or a holiday known for gift 
exchanges, then the jury may infer the tipper’s intent to gift. 
Although the Supreme Court on multiple occasions rejected the idea that 
liability for gifting MNPI should apply to all people and not just friends and 
family,375 the above examples also suggest that a friendship exists between 
the tipper and the tippee.  This Note generally agrees with Abigail Bush’s 
claim that the current application of gift theory represents the minimum 
personal benefit for the tipper.376  However, this Note disagrees that the 
“meaningfully close personal relationship” element from Newman represents 
the best available test to narrow the applicable relationships.377  The 
examples listed above provide evidence that the tipper intended the 
disclosure as a gift or that the tippee intended the tipper to share the proceeds 
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of the tip, both of which satisfy the intent component of Dirks’s personal 
benefit requirement.378 
Despite broadening liability for the personal benefit requirement for gifts 
to all people, this Note disagrees with the Supreme Court’s implication from 
Salman that finding a gift between the original tipper and tippee should taint 
the entire tipping chain.379  Nevertheless, the prosecution can still satisfy the 
burden of proof through evidence that the original tipper intended to gift the 
MNPI to a remote tippee or that the original tippee then intended to gift the 
information to a remote tippee.380  Requiring evidence proving an intent to 
give a gift helps solve the scienter problem for tipping chains where the 
remote tippee may not know the identity of the original tipper.  If the 
prosecution cannot produce evidence showing an intent to gift the MNPI, 
then it must use the complementary test to argue that the tipper intended to 
benefit a particular recipient in order to convict the defendant.381  In cases 
like Salman, the government could raise alternative theories of liability under 
both the gift and intention-to-benefit tests.  Allowing the government to raise 
alternative theories for finding a personal benefit would avoid the liability 
substitution issue that arose between the Martoma I and Martoma II 
decisions. 
A hypothetical concerning two former coworkers illustrates the 
application of the new personal benefit test for gifts.  Imagine that two 
coworkers used to work for the same employer, but one leaves and becomes 
a corporate insider for a different employer.  Because of her corporate 
position, the insider obtains MNPI which she then shares with her former 
coworker.  In addition to tipping the information, the insider sends an email 
to her former coworker stating that she hopes that the information will benefit 
the coworker’s career.  The email provides evidence of the insider’s intent to 
gift the MNPI.  The insider benefitted because she helped the coworker’s 
career prospects.  A prosecutor would not have to prove a close relationship 
between the insider and the coworker.  Alternatively, if the insider did not 
send an email to the coworker and no other evidence exists showing the 
insider’s intent to gift the MNPI, the prosecutor could still convict the 
coworker using an argument that the insider intended to benefit the coworker. 
B.  A Presumption of Legitimacy for Benefiting a Particular Recipient 
This Note believes that insider trading jurisprudence should support the 
general principle that prosecutors must prove charges beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Although Fox, Glosten, and Rauterberg argue that the evidentiary 
burden should be reversed to more effectively deter and prosecute 
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economically harmful insider trading transactions,382 this Note agrees with 
Almousa that insider trading regulations should not cater to prosecutorial 
goals.383  Although this may enable some liable traders to escape punishment, 
this also conforms with constitutional protections for criminal defendants. 
Instead, this Note proposes a new test that establishes a rebuttable 
presumption of legitimacy for disclosures prosecuted under an “intention to 
benefit a particular recipient” theory.  Under this test, all prosecutions begin 
with the presumption that the tipper disclosed the MNPI for a legitimate or 
proper purpose.  The prosecution must then introduce evidence that the tipper 
disclosed the MNPI for an illegitimate or improper purpose.  If the 
prosecution fails to provide any evidence at an evidentiary hearing before 
trial, the judge must dismiss the charges.  If the judge finds that the 
prosecution presented sufficient evidence, the case will proceed to trial.  At 
trial, if the defense produces no evidence supporting the legitimacy of the 
disclosure, then the judge should recommend that the jury convict the 
defendant.  If the defense produces such evidence, the issue becomes a matter 
of fact for the jury to decide.  Similar to the new test for gifts of MNPI, this 
test aligns with Dirks’s goal of distinguishing proper from improper 
disclosures.384 
Proper disclosures include any circumstances where the tipper discloses 
the information for a corporate benefit, the disclosure exposes fraudulent 
activity, or an inadvertent disclosure occurred and the corporation 
subsequently complied with Reg FD.385  Disclosure for a corporate benefit 
occurs, for example, when an insider discloses the information to an investor-
relations team.  The insider expects that the investor-relations team will not 
trade on the information or share the information with other traders.  Instead 
the insider discloses the information so that once the information becomes 
public, the investor-relations team can help to soften stock price drops when 
earnings statements fail to meet quarterly expectations or help to increase 
stock prices if earnings exceed expectations.  This corresponds with goals of 
achieving accurate pricing and efficient allocation of resources for securities 
offerings.386  However, if the investor-relations team discloses the 
information to other tippees who trade before the information becomes 
public, then those tippees become liable because the investor-relations team 
intended for those tippees to benefit.  If a tipping chain discloses the 
information to several recipients for a corporate benefit, a remote tippee 
remains liable once the disclosure no longer occurs for a corporate benefit.  
The improper purpose test helps resolve the issue from Newman where the 
trading tippees were several levels removed from the original tippers.387  
Disclosure to expose corporate frauds should follow the Dirks line of 
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reasoning.388  The protection for inadvertent disclosures avoids chilling 
analyst interviews and additionally helps enforcement of Reg FD. 
Some examples of improper disclosures include giving tips to institutional 
investors to curry favor, telling people they can make a lot of money trading 
on the information, and tipping a sad-looking stranger to help improve that 
stranger’s day.  Repeated disclosures to the same investor also support an 
inference of impropriety.  While some of these examples could arguably 
create liability if the tips were intended as gifts, the intention-to-benefit test, 
operating as an alternative liability theory, corresponds with the Supreme 
Court’s limitation that tippee liability for gifts should only apply to close 
friends and family.389  The intention-to-benefit test ensures a pathway for 
prosecutors to hold such traders liable for these economically harmful types 
of trades, reduces the focus on the scienter necessary for gift convictions, and 
still protects traders’ constitutional rights.  Treating a gift and an intention to 
benefit a particular recipient as complementary liability theories corresponds 
with the complementary treatment of the classical and misappropriation 
theories.390  Additionally, this eliminates the requirement that the prosecution 
prove that remote tippees knew or should have known that the original 
corporate insider tipped the MNPI, if the prosecution can show that the 
trading tippee knew or should have known that the immediate tipper 
improperly disclosed the information.  Finally, the rebuttable presumption 
test helps alleviate evidentiary problems that occur from requiring evidence 
suggesting a quid pro quo relationship.391 
C.  The New Standards Would Promote Fairness and Efficiency in Capital 
Markets 
The new personal benefit test for gifts would help improve the accuracy of 
securities prices.  Even though the new test broadens gift theory liability 
beyond just close friends and family members, it would also require 
prosecutors to introduce more evidence to prove the intent of the tipper to 
give a gift rather than just showing evidence of a close relationship.  
Requiring more evidence makes it harder for prosecutors to show a personal 
benefit and will likely reduce insider trading convictions under a gift liability 
theory.  Fewer convictions will mean that more insider trades will escape 
punishment, which will deter fewer people from engaging in insider trading.  
This, in turn, means that more trading will likely occur and this will gradually 
push the stock price closer to the value of the securities.392  The benefit 
derived from the higher evidentiary burden placed on prosecutors seeking 
convictions under this new gift theory liability will be limited, however, 
because the separate intention-to-benefit test still provides an alternative 
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liability theory that prevents inside trades and punishes people who conduct 
transactions using improper disclosures. 
Although the new personal benefit for gifts standard may reduce 
convictions for insider trading, it does not reduce protections for investors or 
encourage more types of harmful trades.  The new test still aligns with 
Dirks’s goal of preventing gifts of MNPI to trading friends or relatives, 
despite broadening gift theory beyond just these individuals.  The new test 
merely removes the easiest pathway for prosecutors to prove that a tipper 
personally benefits and increases the evidentiary burden for liability, as 
suggested in Newman.393 
The separate test for intending to benefit a particular recipient will also 
help improve the accuracy of securities prices.  Although a separate 
“intention-to-benefit” test may further limit pricing benefits, it also reduces 
the risk of becoming a victim of insider trading.  The reduced risk benefits 
high-frequency traders and should reduce spreads when general investors 
transact with these professionals.394  Lower spreads increase the accuracy of 
stock prices and help securities markets to function more efficiently. 
The new intention-to-benefit test would also protect investors and 
promotes fairness in securities markets.  The test would require proof of an 
improper purpose for any disclosure of MNPI.  Like the new personal benefit 
test for gifts, the intention-to-benefit test will align with the Dirks’s goals 
because it does not impose liability on people who disclose MNPI for a 
proper purpose.  The intention-to-benefit test also recognizes the general 
market harm caused by improper disclosures of MNPI, and criminal liability 
should dissuade investors from engaging in these harmful transactions.395  
Although the intention-to-benefit test should deter harmful transactions, it 
still permits beneficial transactions.396 
Neither the new gift test nor intention-to-benefit test would add new 
restrictions that limit securities professionals’ ability to conduct legitimate 
and beneficial activities.  The new tests would not ban or limit fundamental 
value trading.397  The new tests would still allow securities analysts to 
conduct research, model financial statements, interview corporate officers, 
and make analytical judgments.  These beneficial activities help maintain 
healthy stock markets.398  Lastly, the new personal benefit tests would follow 
the principle articulated in Chiarella and Dirks that securities regulations do 
not require equal access to information and that laws should encourage 
traders to piece information together to make superior analytical 
judgments.399 
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CONCLUSION 
This Note supports the Dirks elements for insider trading convictions but 
proposes two new and distinct tests for determining nonpecuniary personal 
benefits.  The new test for finding a personal benefit from a gift of MNPI 
would require prosecutors to show evidence of the tipper’s intention to gift 
the MNPI.  This test would apply to all people, rather than only to people 
with a meaningfully close personal relationship with the tipper.  The new test 
for intending to benefit a particular recipient would establish a rebuttable 
presumption of legitimacy for any disclosure. 
Tests that more easily find that a tipper received a personal benefit expand 
liability for insider trading.  More liberal personal benefit tests can protect 
individual investors from harm, reduce price spreads for securities 
transactions, deter socially undesirable trades (and encourage socially 
desirable trades), and increase liquidity for securities and capital market 
investments.  By contrast, tests that make tipper personal benefits harder to 
find limit insider trading liability and permit more legal insider trading.  More 
permissible insider trading can improve stock price accuracy, give investors 
more information sooner, and reduce enforcement and administration costs 
while not causing any perceptible harm to investors or reducing public 
confidence in securities markets. 
The two complementary nonpecuniary personal benefit tests correspond 
with the goals of insider trading jurisprudence.  Requiring evidence that 
shows an intent to gift MNPI or an intent to benefit a particular recipient 
aligns with Dirks’s goal of separating improper from proper disclosures.  The 
new tests would also align with Chiarella’s principle that securities laws do 
not require equal access to information.  The new tests would still permit and 
encourage analytical activities that benefit securities markets, such as 
interviewing corporate officers and discovering information to make better 
analytical judgments.  Finally, the new tests would still protect investors from 
becoming victims of insider trading, which should reduce transaction spreads 
for high-frequency traders and improve the price accuracy of securities.  
Because of the benefits identified above, complementary tests of liability for 
gifts of MNPI and an intention to benefit a particular recipient would resolve 
courts’ recent struggles in applying nonpecuniary personal benefit tests. 
